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Abstract 
Lax financial conditions can foster credit booms. The global credit boom of the last decade 
led to large capital flows across the world, including large movements of resources from the 
northern countries of the euro area towards the southern part. Since the start of the crisis and 
more markedly after 2009, these flows have suddenly stopped, creating severe adjustment 
pressure. At this point the common monetary policy can only try to mitigate the unavoidable 
adjustment by maintaining overall financial stability. The challenge is to strike a delicate 
balance  between  providing  liquidity  for  solvent  institutions  while  keeping  the  overall 
pressure on for a rapid correction of the imbalances. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
his  short  contribution  attempts  to  broadly  address  the  four  questions  spelled  out 
below, but without pretending to be exhaustive. We start by offering some general 
considerations. 
The  general  point  is  very straightforward:  There  is  little  a  common  monetary  policy  (or 
macro-prudential tools) can do to affect directly the correction of existing macroeconomic 
imbalances.  In  the  euro  area,  imbalances  were  built  up  over  the  last  decade  as  massive 
capital flows moved from the north to the south of the Monetary Union. Their legacy is a 
debt overhang which leads to financial market distress. The details of the debt overhang vary 
from country to country, but one can distinguish two groups: In Spain and Ireland, foreign 
capital was used to sustain massive construction booms. In Greece and Portugal, foreign 
capital  was  used  to  finance  consumption.  Italy  seems  to  be  a  special  case  as  it  did  not 
experience a pronounced credit boom, but its low growth rates has made a pre-existing large 
stock of public debt appear less and less sustainable in the long run. 
The expansion in domestic demand financed by the capital inflows was in our view the main 
reason  why  southern  euro  area  countries  became  uncompetitive.  Their  loss  of 
competitiveness was thus a symptom, rather than an independent additional cause for the 
present imbalances. This implies that unless exports pick up significantly, the re-balancing 
has  to  come  through  lower  domestic  demand,  which  inevitably  lead  to  lower  GDP. 
Moreover,  given  that  the  accumulation  of  debt  is  a  stock-problem  rather  than  a  flow-
problem, the adjustment is likely to take a long time.    
  Identify  and  evaluate  the  actual  imbalances  between  the  euro  area  countries, and 
between euro area countries and non-EA (euro area) members (EU and non-EU). 
The major imbalance within the euro area is clearly between the countries with a current 
account surplus (mostly north of the Alps, most of them rated AAA by the major ratings 
agencies)  and  the  countries  with  current  account  deficits,  mostly south  of  the  Alps.  The 
challenge for the southern member states is to switch their economies to export-led growth, 
and bring their budget deficits down at a speed that does not depress their economies too 
much and still leads to a rapid decline in the risk premium they are paying.  
There is great heterogeneity among the non-euro member states. The smaller ones, mainly 
the Baltics, with very large current account deficits prior to the crisis, have experienced large 
falls  in  GDP,  but  are  now  recording  positive  growth.  Others,  like  Poland,  were  only 
marginally affected by the crisis.  
  How did the common monetary policy in the euro area contribute to the build-up of 
these imbalances and how can it contribute to its reduction? 
With the benefit of hindsight, the common monetary policy was too expansionary for too 
long. This, together with specific features of local credit markets, is likely to have contributed 
to the housing booms in Ireland and Spain. However, the decisive driving factor behind the 
build-up of the intra-euro area imbalances was a global credit boom sustained by a high level 
of risk appetite throughout global financial markets during which the sustainability of the 
domestic demand booms in southern Europe was not an issue. The euro area as a whole 
maintained a rough balance in its current account because most of the capital that flowed 
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into southern Europe originated from northern Europe, which has built up an apparently 
structural excess supply of savings over the last decade. There is little the common monetary 
policy can do to reduce these imbalances, which were built up over almost a decade. All the 
ECB can do is to mitigate the costs of the unavoidable adjustment by safeguarding financial 
stability.   
In an ideal world the reduction in domestic demand in southern Europe enforced by the 
sudden  stop  of  (private)  capital  flows  would  be  matched  by  an  expansion  in  northern 
Europe. However, this is not a task for a common monetary policy. It requires action at the 
national level. 
  What are the links and differences in the various instruments, indicators used by the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) (macro-prudential oversight) and in the new 
Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP)? 
Both the ESRB and EIP were created for the main purpose of averting the build-up of new 
imbalances. In this sense, they are of limited importance once imbalances have already built 
up. However, both can contribute to foster the intra-area adjustment that is now required. 
The new EIP should provide member states with guidance on how to achieve the re-balance 
and  cope  with  its  effects  on  the  real  economy,  whereas  the  ESRB  can  contribute  to  the 
mitigation  of  systemic  risk  within  the  financial  sphere  arising  from  macroeconomic 
developments. 
  What is the role of the ECB (European Central Bank), which other institutions are 
involved  and  what  is  their  mandate?  Are  there  possible  conflicts  of  interest, 
inconsistencies in their respective roles and objectives? 
The common monetary policy can, by definition, do little to correct the existing intra-area 
imbalances. The adjustment has to come inevitably from individual countries; the ECB can 
only contribute to contain financial instability and avert disruptions in the financial sector. 
Yet, this may come at the cost of reducing member states’ incentives to adopt the required 
corrections. This is a source of dilemma for the ECB: it is the only institution that can prevent 
a breakdown but also the only one that can really enforce the adjustment. 
The ECB has an interest in seeing the maximum adjustment effort at the national level in 
order to limit its own exposure to risk and to re-establish financial stability as quickly as 
possible. By contrast, the national authorities of the countries where the corrections are more 
painful  and  politically  more  difficult  to  implement,  like  in  the  southern  member  states 
affected by sudden capital stops, have an interest in receiving a maximum of support from 
the ECB.  
Moreover, the recent letter by Mario Draghi on the need for country-specific modulation of 
supervision  has  shown  that  the  existence  of  sources  of  macro-prudential  risks  that  are 
country-specific, and thus require country-specific measures, might lead to an institutional 
conflict. For the institutions concerned with financial stability (the ECB and the ESRB), some 
country-specific differences in the application of supervisory rules might be unavoidable, but 
this approach conflicts with the mandate of the Commission, whose primary concern is to 
defend the integrity of the internal market. 
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1.  Introduction 
During the first decade after the start of EMU, the euro area and more broadly the global 
economy  experienced  an  unprecedented  credit  boom.  The  expansion  of  credit  was 
particularly  robust  in  the  southern  countries:  Greece,  Portugal  and  Spain,  as  well  as  in 
Ireland.  The  difficulties  these  countries  are  now  experiencing  are  the  consequence  of  a 
‘sudden stop’ in the private capital flows they became accustomed to receiving during the 
boom years. 
Market financing, which had been excessively abundant until 2009 for both governments and 
the private sector, suddenly dried up during 2010, and the government of Greece and later of 
Ireland and Portugal were no longer able to fund themselves at any sustainable price.  
One question that often asked is why did financial markets, which had provided Greece with 
ample financing over years when its current account deficits and the (approximate) size of its 
public debt were well known, almost out of the blue suddenly review their position.  
To  answer  the  question  it  should  be  considered  that,  beyond  the  change  in  the  risk 
perception, growth perspective also changed radically in 2009.  
While Greek GDP, as well as the Irish and the Spanish GDP, were growing in nominal terms 
by over 7% and nominal (long-term) interest rates were around 4% during the boom phase, 
when the crisis broke, nominal (actual and expected) growth rates became much smaller or 
even negative and market interest rates asked on governments’ debt, as well as the private 
sector, started to rise.  
This change lies at the root of the sudden stop in capital flows and it is the point after which 
macroeconomic imbalances have become plainly apparent. It is now the moment for the 
adjustment.  
But crucial questions arise about how to correct imbalances, how to share the burden of the 
adjustment and what is the role of the European Institutions, foremost the European Central 
Bank (ECB), in this process. 
The remainder of this short note is organized as follows. Section 2 identifies macroeconomic 
imbalances,  focusing  on  intra-euro  area  current  account  disequilibria  and  the  role  of 
competitiveness. Section 3 briefly assesses the role of the common monetary policy and the 
monetary transmission mechanisms in the build-up of the imbalances. Section 4 introduces 
the possible role of the ECB and the ESRB in the process of rebalance and potential sources of 
inconsistency. The last section concludes. 
2.  Macroeconomic Imbalances and the Excessive Imbalances Procedure 
Since the onset of the financial crisis, and even more after the start of the sovereign debt 
crisis in the euro area, a lot attention has been devoted to macroeconomic imbalances. Within 
the  euro  area,  macroeconomic  imbalances  refer  to  the  existence  of  disequilibria  in  the 
external position, i.e. the current account of member countries, vis-à-vis each other, rather 
than to the position of the entire area vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The major imbalance within the euro area is the one arising between the group of countries 
with a current account surplus, mostly north of the Alps and rated AAA by the major ratings 
agencies, and the countries with current account deficits, mostly south of the Alps, with the 
exception of Ireland.   
Figure 11 shows that that the current account of the entire euro area has remained roughly in 
balance since the start of EMU, but after 2001 the balances of the north and south behave like 
the mirror image of each other with movements of opposite sign. 
Figure 1. The flow problem: Current account imbalances (selected EZ countries) 
 
Source: Own calculation on European Commission Services (Ameco) data 
Note: North EZ includes Austria, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands & Finland; south EZ 
includes Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal & Ireland. 
The size of the current account ‘im’balances has diminished during the last two years. The 
‘flow’ imbalances are thus becoming somewhat less acute. But the legacy of many years of 
flow imbalances is large ‘stock’ imbalances. Figure 2 shows that the north and south have 
accumulated huge stocks of opposite sign: net foreign assets of more than €2,000 billion for 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Germany and the Netherlands and a huge foreign 
debt of almost €1,400 billion just for Greece, Portugal and Spain, against amounting to over 
€1,600  billion  for  the  entire  ‘south’.  Even  if  the  flow  imbalances  diminish  (or  were  to 
disappear  completely),  large  stocks  constitute  a  potential  problem  since  they  have  to  be 
rolled over continuously. Financial crises arise mainly when investors refuse to roll over 
existing stocks.  
                                                   
1  The  two  groups  are  simply defined  according  to  the  common  behaviour  of  the current  account 
balance  since  the  creation  of  the  EMU.  The  north  EZ  includes  Austria,  Germany,  Belgium, 
Luxembourg,  Netherlands  &  Finland,  countries  which  had  current  account  surplus  each  year  (or 
almost)  over  the  period  2000-10.  By  contrast  south  EZ  includes  Greece,  Italy,  Spain,  Ireland  & 
Portugal, which displayed a deficit every year (or almost). France is intentionally left out as its current 
account behaviour exhibits a mixed feature, surplus over the period 2000-2005 and deficit afterwards. 
Holinski et al. (2012) use cluster analysis to identity two different groups of countries and end up with 
similar conclusion. The main difference is Italy which according to their results is in a position similar 
to the one of France (i.e. not sharing clearly the features of either group). 
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
North EZ
South EZ
EZ
B
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
E
U
RHOW TO DEAL WITH MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES?  5 
 
Figure 2. The stock problem: Cumulated current account imbalances 
 
Source: Own calculation on European Commission Services (Ameco) data 
Note: See Figure 1 for definition of the groups. 
One cannot interpret the imbalances in Figure 2 directly as bilateral imbalances between the 
north and the south of the euro area, since there is a global capital market and the current 
account is always ‘erga omnes’. However, the close negative correlation in the flows suggests 
a link. In reality, the link might be due to the structure of financial markets in the savings-
rich northern eurozone countries. There most of the excess savings is intermediated by the 
banking system and other highly regulated intermediaries (insurance companies, pension 
funds,  etc.).  These  intermediaries  have  a  strong  ‘home  bias’,  or  rather  a  bias  towards 
investing in the euro area. For financial intermediaries, most regulations impose limits on 
investments outside the euro area or non-euro denominated. For small savers, investment in 
the home currency is always the first choice. This implies that, under normal conditions, 
there is a strong propensity for the excess savings in the north of the euro area to be invested 
somewhere else in the euro area itself. In this sense one can speak of a flow of resources 
running from north to south since the introduction of the single currency. 
However, since 2009, private cross-border flows have reverted suddenly and since the start 
of the euro crisis a massive withdrawal of foreign private resources has taken place in the 
south of the euro area. Adjusting to this sudden stop in the inflows of capital that benefited 
south EZ countries for years is the key task at present. Without the previous capital inflows 
that  had  financed  construction  (in  Spain  and  Ireland),  and  consumption  (in  Greece  and 
Portugal and to a lesser extent Italy), southern euro area countries are now forced to cut both 
construction  investment  and  consumption,  with  large  negative  effects  on  GDP  and 
unemployment as shown in Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3. Unemployment and growth 
   
Data Source: European Commission Services. 
The fact that the current account of the entire euro area remains broadly balanced means that 
the euro area, taken as a whole, has sufficient resources to fund the financial needs of all the 
countries of the eurozone, including those of the governments running large deficits. But 
why a ‘euro crisis’, if enough ‘domestic’ resources exist to deal with it? The key problem is 
the distribution of savings within the euro area. As documented above, large savings are 
available in the north of the Alps but, savers from core eurozone countries no longer are 
willing ‘to cross the Alps’ to finance southern countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece. This 
is the essential reason why the south is experiencing a financial crisis while, at the same time, 
financial conditions in Germany remain benign and the German government could issue 
short-term paper at zero or negative rates.  
Current  account  imbalances  rarely  occur  in  isolation.  It  is  thus  difficult  to  keep  them 
separated from the accompanying fiscal and competitiveness issue. Here we will focus on 
the link between current account imbalances and competitiveness divergence.  
2.1  How to manage the adjustment: The role of competitiveness 
The official diagnosis of the current account imbalances within the euro area is quite simple: 
the south let its competitiveness deteriorate via unjustified wage increase, whereas the north 
(Germany in primis) kept costs under control and became more competitive. However, this 
diagnosis provides at best a partial explanation of the run-up to the crisis and is seriously 
incomplete, if taken in isolation, as a guide for policy.  
Divergences in competitiveness within the euro area have been central to the policy debate 
for some years. The former President of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, is said to have shown 
for several years at each meeting of the European Council a chart with the divergence in unit 
labour costs (ULC) among euro area member countries. This has apparently struck a chord 
with policy-makers. The new Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) introduced by the 
European Commission with the large package of changes to the economic governance of the 
eurozone  in  2010  contains  within  its  scoreboard  (see  Box  1),  as  key  elements,  two 
competiveness indicators: relative unit labour costs and consumer prices (relative to a large 
number of industrial countries). One legacy of the euro crisis is thus that competitiveness 
indicators now play a key role in the economic governance of the eurozone. 
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In the ‘Scoreboard for the Surveillance of Macroeconomic Imbalances’ (2012), the European 
Commission emphasises that the indicators are neither policy targets nor policy instruments. 
Rather,  in  the  alert  mechanism,  the  results  of  the  scoreboard  are  interpreted  from  an 
economic perspective with a view to identifying developments in member states that may 
point to a risk of imbalances and therefore require further in-depth analysis. 
 
The idea behind the IEP is to use these indicators as potential warning signals and then to 
force member countries to take 'remedial action' should these indicators signal ‘excessive 
imbalances’.  
However there are a number of reasons to believe that this obsession with competitiveness is 
unlikely to lead to better policies. There are several reasons for this: 
1.  It is difficult to determine the right or ‘equilibrium’ level of competitiveness. 
2.  The link between competitiveness and exports 
3.  Wage costs are determined in labour markets, not by government fiat => governments 
can do little in the short run to affect competitiveness.  
4.  Wage costs are determined in labour markets => competitiveness is endogenous. 
We now discuss each aspect in turn. 
2.1.1  What is the equilibrium level of competitiveness? 
A first point is that competitiveness, usually measured as a relative unit labour cost (ULC), is 
a  relative  concept.  The  gain  of  one  country  is  the  loss  of  another.  Hence  restoring  the 
competitiveness of a member country (e.g. Greece) implies deterioration for others (Germany 
in the first instance): the adjustment might come about either through wage increases in the 
lower labour cost countries or cuts in those with a too high cost. There is a consensus that no 
country  should  be  forced  to  increase  wages  and  everybody  gains  if  structural  reforms 
Box 1. Scoreboard for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances 
The  initial  scoreboard  consists  of  a  set  of  ten  indicators  with  indicative  thresholds.  Two 
indicators  aim  at  monitoring  external  positions,  three  indicators  capture  competitiveness 
developments and the subsequent five indicators reflect internal imbalances.  
1.  three-year backward moving average of the current account balance as a percent of GDP, 
with a threshold of +6% and - 4%; 
2.  net international investment position as a percent of GDP, with a threshold of -35%; 
3.  five-year percentage change of export market shares measured in values, with a threshold 
of -6%; 
4.  three-year percentage change in nominal unit labour cost, with thresholds of +9% for 
euro-area countries and +12% for non-euro-area countries, respectively; 
5.  three-year  percentage change  of  the  real  effective  exchange  rates  based  on  HICP/CPI 
deflators, relative to 35 other industrial countries, with thresholds of -/+5% for euro area 
countries and -/+11% for non-euro-area countries, respectively; 
6.  private sector debt as a percent of GDP with a threshold of 160%; 
7.  private sector credit flow as a percent of GDP with a threshold of 15%; 
8.  year-on-year changes in the house price index relative to a Eurostat consumption deflator, 
with a threshold of 6%; 
9.  general government sector debt as a percent of GDP with a threshold of 60%; and 
10. three-year backward moving average of the unemployment rate, with a threshold of 10%. 
Source: European Commission Occasional Paper No. 92 / February 2012. 8 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
increase productivity, but this does not change the fundamental fact that if German wages 
increase  (relative  to  productivity),  intra-eurozone  divergence  is  reduced  by  definition. 
Indeed this is what is happening now. 
A  second  point  is  that  it  is  always  difficult  to  determine  the  proper  base  year  for  the 
competitiveness index. It is usually assumed that the start of EMU is an equilibrium and 
hence  the  best  base,  but  there  is  no  actual  economic  ground  for  it.  When  EMU  started 
Germany had a current account deficit and it was widely accepted at the time that it had 
entered the euro at an overvalued exchange rate, and that in a monetary union would have 
had hard time to regain competitiveness.2  
Figure 4. Real Harmonised Competitiveness indicator: unit labour cost (ULC) in total economy. LHS: 
ULC base year 1999, RHS: re-scaled to average 1995-2005  
   
Source: ECB Statistical Warehouse and own computation 
Note: ECB EER-20 group of currencies and euro area 17 country currencies. 
The chart on the left hand side of Figure 4 shows the evolution of the ULC in some euro area 
countries, assuming that 1999 is the base year, while the chart on the right hand side shows 
the same index re-scaled dividing it by its average over the period 1995-2010 to remove the 
biased induced by the choice of the base year. The comparison suggests that 1999 might not 
have been equilibrium itself. When the long-term average is taken as equilibrium concept, 
2003 appears to be year of the smallest cross-country differences. It also emerges that prior to 
2003 Germany was one of the countries with lowest competitiveness (many countries were 
below the 100 line), while after 2003, the countries that have experienced a significant loss in 
competitiveness  are  those  where  bubbles  had  developed,  e.g.  Ireland  and  Spain.3 
Importantly, the consequence of a bias in the base year is a bias in the measurement of the 
divergence. Any analyses based on 1999 as equilibrium year will conclude that countries 
now in difficulties have lost about 25-30% in terms of ULC relative to Germany, while using 
                                                   
2 See Wyplosz (1999). 
3 See Gros (2010), “Adjustment Difficulties in the GIPSY Club”, CEPS Working Document No. 326, 
CEPS, Brussels, March. 
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the long term average as equilibrium concept suggests a loss of about 15%, a substantially 
smaller estimate of the remaining divergence. The purpose of these simple considerations is 
not to show that unambiguously 2003 should be taken as proper base year, but how difficult 
it is in practice to measure divergences in competitiveness.  
2.1.2  Does competitiveness determine export success? 
A  more  fundamental  reason  to  be  sceptical  about  the  usefulness  of  the  standard 
competitiveness  indicators  is  that  their  power  to  predict  export  success  is  rather  low. In 
principle a loss of competitiveness should lead to lower exports, or at least lower market 
shares.  Given  that  all  five  countries  of  the  south  have  current  account  deficits,  it  seems 
obvious that their loss of competitiveness must be at the core of their problems. However, a 
closer look at the data reveals that this is not necessarily the case. 
Figure 5. Exports of goods and services and competitiveness vs. Market share (MIP 2011) 
   
Source: European Commission services (Ameco database). 
A  first  problem  with  the  standard  view  is  that  the  most  important  and  immediate 
consequence of a loss of competitiveness should be lower exports. But the evolution of the 
export market shares does not support this hypothesis. Figure 5, on the left had side, shows 
the share of the exports of goods and services of each country in overall EU-27 exports: all 
lines  are  essentially  flat  and  not  downwards  sloping  as  one  would  expect.  The  only 
exception is Italy, the country which experienced the lowest loss of competitiveness. 
The  relatively  strong  export  performance  of  these  supposedly  ‘uncompetitive’  economies 
raises the question: where do their deficits come from? The easy answer is an excess on the 
import side: excessive domestic spending, on consumption in Greece and Portugal (and to 
some extent Italy) and on construction in Spain and Ireland could be responsible. 
However, for most of the GIPS, the balance of trade (in goods and services) has actually 
improved  between  2000  and  2010.  This  suggests  that  in  a  country  starting  with  a  large 
imbalance, not only exports need to grow significantly, but much more than imports for the 
trade balance to improve. In the case specific case of Greece the current account was already 
in  large  deficit  when  the  country  joined  the  euro  and  the  trade  balance  changed  little 
between 2000 and 2010 (despite the huge increase in relative ULC), but the current account 
did  not  improve  because  other  flows  turned  negative  (income,  unilateral  transfer  and 
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transfers from the EU). The negative impact on the income balance is explained by the huge 
accumulation of foreign debt which the country has to service. This provides evidence that a 
country which has run large deficits for a long time cannot simply return to the ‘status quo 
ante’, but must actually run a surplus on goods and services in order to service its debt. 
The  real  challenge  for  countries  with  a  large  foreign  debt  materializes  when  financing 
conditions deteriorate and a larger part of income must be devoted to service the external 
debt– whatever the situation in terms of the usual competitiveness indicators. 
2.1.3  Competitiveness is not a policy variable 
Policy discussions about competitiveness suffer usually from one key oversight: EU member 
countries  are  not  centrally  planned  economies.  There  is  little  a  government  can  do  in  a 
market  economy  to  force  lower  wages  in  the  private  sector.  Governments  can  of  course 
enforce wage cuts in the public sector. This has been done in almost all EU countries and 
most notably in Latvia, Greece, Ireland and Spain for example, but there is little empirical 
evidence that public sector wage trends have an economically significant impact on wage 
growth in the private sector.4 The most recent data show that nominal wages have fallen in 
the year 2010 in the Baltic countries and in Ireland, while in 2011 only in Ireland and Greece. 
2.1.4  Competitiveness is endogenous 
The view that a loss of competitiveness constitutes the root cause of the difficulties in the 
periphery must somehow start from the proposition that wage costs are some an exogenous 
variable.  However, while many countries have a ‘wage policy’, labour costs are in the end 
mostly determined by the interaction of demand and supply in the labour market. 
Figure 6. Correlation between domestic demand and ULC 
 
Source: European Commission Services (Ameco). 
Note: ULC is nominal unit labour costs: total economy (ratio of compensation per employee to real 
GDP per person employed.)  
                                                   
4  See  A.  Lamo,  L.  Schuknecht  and  J.J.  Pérez,  “Public  and  private  sector  wages:  Co-movement 
causality”, ECB Working Paper Series 963/2008, ECB, Frankfurt, for empirical studies, which find 
econometrically significant effects, but the orders of magnitude remain so small that any politically 
feasible autonomous change in public wages would have only a negligible impact on private sector 
wages. 
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Figure  6  shows  a  strong  correlation  between  domestic  demand  and  labour  cost.  The 
countries which have experienced the largest expansion in domestic demand are the same 
who have also see the largest loss in competiveness. 
On this ground, one may argue that, if labour markets are allowed to work, the losses of 
competitiveness,  observed  during  the  boom  phase,  should  reverse  themselves  over  time 
during the burst.  
Data suggest that after 2010 domestic demand has strengthened (or better, is less weak) in 
the surplus countries. This should imply that over time the labour markets in these countries 
should tighten leading to relatively larger wage increases. The opposite should occur in the 
south. This is the kind of process that will lead to a fall in labour cost divergence.  
3.  Common Monetary policy and the build-up of the imbalances 
The decisive driving factor behind the build-up of the imbalances was a global credit boom 
sustained by a high level of risk appetite throughout global financial markets. 
With the benefit of hindsight, one can also claim that the stance of the common monetary 
policy was too expansionary for too long. But we would argue that this was not the main 
reason for the excessive expansion in consumption and construction that occurred in some 
countries. It was rather the fact that monetary policy transmission mechanisms have worked 
differently in different countries due to large differences in the financial structure of different 
member states.  
The argument goes beyond the Walters’ critique, which starts from the observation that the 
common monetary policy is bound to be more expansionary in countries where inflation is 
high and more contractionary where inflation rates are low because the real interest rate is 
lower in the former and higher in the latter.  
In  our  view  the  problem  was  not  so  much  about  inflation  differential  but  about  credit 
conditions. Figure 7 gives an example of the differences across groups of member states in 
credit conditions by looking at lending for house purchases.  
Figure 7. Interest rates on lending for house purchase 
 
Source: ECB. 
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During the years of the credit boom, average interest rates on mortgages actually paid by 
borrowers  in  Ireland  and  Spain  (blue  line)  were  much  lower  relative  to  Germany  and 
northern Europe in general (green line). The reason for this is that in Ireland and Spain most 
mortgages  were  at  floating  rates,  linked  to  short-term  rates  (like  three  month  LIBOR) 
whereas in Germany most mortgages are at fixed long-term rates, which remained usually 2-
3 percentage points higher.  
To  this  one  should  add  that  also  credit  access  was  different  across  countries,  while  in 
Germany and northern Europe, mortgages are usually limited to 60% of the value of the 
house, in Spain and Ireland loan-to-value ratios of 100% became increasingly common. 
For a more detailed examination of the monetary transmission mechanisms within the euro 
area, see Gros (2011). 
4.  The role of the ECB and the ESRB 
There is little the common monetary policy can do to reduce the imbalances which were built 
up  over  almost  a  decade.  However,  the  ECB  can  mitigate  the  costs  of  adjustment  by 
safeguarding financial stability. 
The ECB is of course not the only institution concerned with financial stability. According to 
the ESRB Regulation: “The ESRB shall be responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the 
financial system within the Union in order to contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic 
risks to financial stability in the Union that arise from developments within the financial system and 
taking  into  account  macro-economic  developments, so  as  to  avoid  periods  of  widespread  financial 
distress.” 
It is now too late to ‘avoid periods of widespread financial distress’, but the work of the 
ESRB is still very relevant in the sense that it can point out the areas where distress might 
become most acute as the adjustment process takes it course. 
A  problem  that  is  unavoidable  in  this  context  is  that  given  the  existing  imbalances  the 
dangers  to  financial  stability  are  usually  specific  to  a  limited  number  of  countries.  This 
implies that an institution like the ESRB will have to call for action at the national level, 
including country specific differences in the application of financial market regulation. This 
conflicts of course with the aim of establishing a ‘single rule book’, or in general the aim of 
establishing a ‘level playing field’ within the internal market. Institutionally, the conflict is 
thus between the ECB/ESRB and the Commission. 
5.  Concluding remark 
During the first decade after the start of EMU, the euro area and more broadly the global 
economy  experienced  an  unprecedented  credit  boom.  The  expansion  of  credit  was 
particularly  robust  in  the  southern  countries.  The  difficulties  these  countries  are  now 
experiencing are the consequence of a ‘sudden stop’ in the private capital flows they became 
accustomed to receiving during the boom years. 
In this note we argue that the expansion in domestic demand financed by the capital inflows 
was the main reason behind the loss of competitiveness in the southern euro area countries.  
Uncontrolled demand expansion based on credit inflows is the main source of the current 
imbalances.  Alas,  years  of  accumulation  of  flows  have  generated  a  large  stock  problem, 
mostly debt, which has to be corrected. For the correction to happen, the main effort has to 
come  inevitably  from  individual  countries.  European  Institutions,  i.e.  the  European 
Commission, the ECB and the ESRB, can only affect the process marginally. The Commission 
can provide member states with guidance on how to achieve the re-balance and cope with its HOW TO DEAL WITH MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES?  13 
 
effects  on  the  real  economy.  The  ESRB  can  contribute  to  the  mitigation  of  systemic  risk 
within the financial sphere arising from macroeconomic developments. Last but not least, the 
ECB  can  contribute  to  contain  financial  instability  and  avert  disruptions  in  the  financial 
sector.  
Given the heterogeneity of the crisis within the euro area and the country specificities, the 
main risk is that conflict emerges between internal market rules and the need for measures 
adapted to individual countries.   
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